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IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER
ARCHITECTS, a professional
corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 860576

vs.
ROGER H. ELTON and
JOHN H. LAUB,

Category No. 14(b)

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER ARCHITECTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On August 4, 1987, appellant John H. Laub filed a
federal bankruptcy petition and the parties may be subject in
this action to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), which
operates with respect to Hthe . . . continuation . . . of a
judicial . . . proceeding against the debtor that was . . .
commenced before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case.H
Accordingly, the parties stipulated to stay the appeal of John
H. Laub, and this brief is filed only as to appellant Elton.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Respondent Brixen & Christopher Architects
(hereinafter HBrixen & Christopher**) is satisfied with the
statement of appellant Elton regarding jurisdiction and the
nature of the proceedings below.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

The attempt by Elton to frame his first issue

(••Whether the trial court was entitled to render judgment in
favor of Respondents [sic] (. . . Brixen & Christopher)
contrary to the written provisions of Brixen & Christopher's
own letter and architectural form contract which combined
documents the lower court specifically determined to be the
contract between the parties.-) wrongly assumes that the trial
court judgment is contrary to the contract.

In fact/ the trial

court judgment against Elton is in accordance with the contract.
B.

Brixen & Christopher is satisfied with the second

issue stated by Elton:

"Whether the trial court incorrectly

determined that Appellants . . . were estopped to deny that
Brixen & Christopher's services were authorized."

The trial

court correctly ruled that Elton was so estopped.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.

This is respondent Brixen &

Christopher's action to recover amounts owed to it for
architectural services performed for appellants Roger H. Elton
and John H. Laub# who were developing the "Wolf Creek
Recreation Center" in Eden/ Utah.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below.
After a 3-day trial on Brixen & Christopher's complaint/ the
Honorable Scott Daniels, sitting without jury, awarded Brixen &
Christopher judgment against Elton and Laub in the amount of
$50/500 plus interest and costs.
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The trial court found that Brixen & Christopher had
provided architectural services as requested by Elton and Laub,
that Brixen & Christopher kept Elton and Laub informed of
progress with the design throughout the project, that Elton and
Laub never objected to Brixen & Christopher's interim billings,
and that, when Brixen & Christopher sought payment for the
services based on which judgment was awarded/ Elton told Brixen
& Christopher that he was pleased with their work, agreed that
payment was long overdue, and promised on more than one
occasion that payment would be made.
Relief sought on appeal.

Brixen & Christopher

requests that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court
against Elton.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts by Elton relies on his side of
conflicting evidence and ignores the findings of fact of the
trial court while at the same time implicitly attacking them.
The treatment of the findings by Elton is inconsistent with the
standards established by this Court.

This language of

Redevelopment Agency v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1987)
applies with equal force here:
[A]ppellantsf claims are predicated on our
acceptance of their version of the events which
occurred and how the trial courts should have
perceived the circumstances as they existed. However/
the facts appellants advance in support of their
arguments are carefully chosen to the exclusion of
other evidence in the records supporting the lower
courts' decisions. Due to the trial court's
advantaged position/ the presumptions favor its
judgment. Where there is dispute and disagreement in
the evidence, we assume that the trial judge believed
-3-

those aspects and fairly drew the inferences to be
derived therefrom which gave his decision support. To
this end, neither trial judge found credible the
evidence appellants marshalled.
Id. at 1301-02 (footnotes omitted)-1
The facts are appropriately set forth in the trial
court's detailed findings of fact, R 52-57.

Brixen &

Christopher states those findings here with citations to the
record supporting the findings and with footnotes showing that,
contrary to the MfactsH claimed by Elton, the facts found by
the trial court are supported by the record:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In the period from March 1982 to January 1983,

plaintiff Brixen & Christopher Architects, a Utah architectural
professional corporation, ("Brixen & Christopher") performed
architectural services for defendants Roger H. Elton and John
H. Laub, who were developing the "Wolf Creek Recreation Center"

1

See also Nupetco Associates v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 882
(Utah 1983) ("[T]he evidence and all of the inferences that can
reasonably be drawn therefrom [are viewed] in the light most
favorable to the findings and conclusions of the trial court
. . . . " ) ; Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1985)
("On appeal, the findings of the trial court will not be
disturbed unless there is no substantial record evidence to
support them. . . . In reviewing the evidence, we view it in
the light most favorable to the trial court."); Scharf v. BMG
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) ("To mount a successful
attack on the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must
marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in light
most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient
to support the findings.") (citations omitted); 5A J. Moore &
J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice § 52.06[1], at 52-151 and
-152 (2d ed. 1986).
-4-

in Eden, Utah.

[R 145, R 267-68, ex. 1]. The real property

onwhich the recreation center was to be built was owned solely
by Laub.

[R 389-90, R 441].
2.

Elton and Laub told James W. Christopher, a

principal of Brixen & Christopher, that they were partners and
at all times, by their words and conduct with respect to Brixen
& Christopher, Elton and Laub acted as if they were partners.
[R 148, R 290, R 389-90, R 458, ex. 1 (pages 98, 94-93, 88,
85-81, 79-76, 57, 54, 48-47, 46-45, 34-33, 3-1)].
3.

Following the first meeting between Christopher,

Elton, and Laub on March 3, 1982, Elton and Laub signed an
initial letter agreement, dated March 4, 1982, whereby Brixen &
Christopher agreed to provide preliminary architectural design
services in connection with the planned Wolf Creek Recreation
Center for a fee of $7,500.00 (Exhibit M 1 H ) .

[R 145-46,

R 396-97, R 445-46, ex. 1 (pages 3-1)].
4.

An attachment to the initial letter agreement

indicated that the total architectural services would be in
five phases:

(1) programming and schematic design, (2) design

development, (3) construction [or contract] documents, (4)
bidding or negotiation, and (5) construction administration.
The initial letter agreement covered the first phase only.
stated fee for the first phase was $7,500.00 (Exhibit

H

The

l").

[Ex. 1, pages 3-1].
5.

Brixen & Christopher proceeded with work on the

project and held additional meetings both with Elton and Laub
and with employees of Wolf Creek.

-5-

[R 142-47, 151-52].

6.

Several preliminary drawings were prepared.

Changes were made to respond to concerns of Wolf Creek,
particularly those of Laub.

[R 155-59].

By July 28, 1982, the

programming and schematic design phase, referred to in the
initial letter agreement, had been completed.

At a meeting

that day, Elton and Laub authorized Brixen & Christopher to
proceed with the balance of the architectural services in
connection with the recreation center.2

[R 165-66, R 315-18].

Christopher was told to prepare a contract to reflect this
authorization [R 167-68]

and that Elton would be his contact.

[R 172] •
7.

On or about July 29, 1982, Brixen & Christopher

issued to Elton and Laub a statement showing that the
programming and schematic design phase had been completed, that
the hourly fees on that phase had exceeded the agreed upon
limit of $7,500.00, and that the $7,500.00 fee was then due.
[R 278, R 286, ex. 1 (page 91)].

2

Elton observes that at trial he and Laub -denied giving
approval to proceed with the other phases- and -testified that
Christopher said Brixen & Christopher wanted to continue
working on first phase requirements.- Brief of Elton and Laub
at 4-5 (paras. 9-10; see also para. 11). But as Elton notes,
Christopher testified that the approval was given, R 165-66, R
315-18, and he confirmed it by letter, ex. 1 (pages 34-30).
The refinements discussed at the July 28, 1982 meeting were
part of the second -design development- phase, not the first
-schematic design- phase. R 313-17, R 370. (In any event, the
refinements were completed shortly after the July 28, 1982
meeting. R 318.) Brixen & Christopher even sent Elton and
Laub a bill for the completed schematic design phase. R 278,
ex. 1 (page 91). Elton and Laub did not object to the letter
and had orally agreed to the terms of the letter, R 53
(findings of fact, para. 8), R 168-69. Elton promised
(Footnote 2 continued on next page.)
-6-

8.

On Monday, August 2, 1982, Christopher sent Elton

and Laub a letter which confirmed Elton and Laub's decision to
proceed with the architectural work on the recreation center
and set forth the fee arrangement by which Brixen & Christopher
Architects would be compensated for doing so.
[pages 34-30] & H 42 w ).

(Exhibits "1M

While the August 2, 1982 letter was

never signed by Laub and Elton, they had orally agreed to its
terms, and Brixen & Christopher proceeded with the authorized
architectural work as set forth in the letter agreement with
the full knowledge of Elton and Laub.3
9.

[R 168-69, R 321].

Brixen & Christopher hired consultants to work on

site design, as well as electrical, mechanical and structural

(Footnote 2 cont.)
that he and Laub would sign and return the letter. R 321.
They even prepared a check, which Laub assumed was delivered,
to pay the bill, R 54 (findings of fact, para. 12), R 461-62,
ex. 45. Last, but not least, they admitted owing the money. R
56-57 (findings of fact, paras. 18, 23-25), R 266, R 273-76, R
279-81, ex. 1 (pages 98-97, 87-88, 85, 79). In light of
overwhelming evidence, the trial court for good reason did not
believe the denials and testimony of Elton and Laub.
3

Elton invites this Court to ignore this finding and the
substantial evidence supporting it and instead believe the
incredible trial testimony of Elton and Laub, which no writing
supports, that they objected to the August 2, 1982 letter. See
Brief of Elton and Laub at 5-6 (paras. 12-14). Elton claims in
particular that, contrary to the letter, he and Laub placed an
$800,000 limit on the total cost of the project, including site
development, but as to this claim also, he acknowledges
evidence conflicting with his position. Brief of Elton and
Laub at 3 & 5 (paras. 3 & 12). Christopher testified that the
initial $800,000 estimate was for the Recreation Center only,
excluding site development. It is not reasonable to think that

-7-

engineering design.4

[R 174# R 177-78, R 205-10 (structural),

R 222-28 (mechanical), R 239-42 (electrical), R 250-54 (site),
R 285] .
10.

By August 31, 1982, requirements for a fall 1982

construction commitment were being reviewed.

[R 180, ex. 1

(page 41)]. More meetings and correspondence occurred.
180-85, ex. 1 (pages 46-42)].

[R

Brixen & Christopher assisted

Wolf Creek in proceedings before the Weber County Planning
Commission.
11.

[R 463, R 471].
In addition to communicating progress on the

project to Elton and Laub, Brixen & Christopher worked closely

(Footnote 3 cont.)
if the construction estimate had actually been 50%, or
$400,000, more than Elton and Laub planned to spend that
Christopher would have totally ignored such an owner mandate
and continued to work on the project based on substantially
larger figures, see ex. 1 (pages 34 & 57), and that Elton and
Laub would not have generated some document or at least some
scrap of paper reflecting the alleged discrepancy. Even their
deposition testimony conflicts with Elton's claims. Laub
testified in his deposition that he tried to keep all
communications through Elton, R 463-64, and that he never
contacted Brixen & Christopher about the August 2 letter, R
459-60 (trial transcript in error refers to August 2 letter as
August 26th letter). Elton testified in his deposition that he
did not even recall the critical July 28, 1982 meeting on which
the letter agreement was based, R 424, or an earlier March 10,
1982 meeting, R 421. Thus Elton's vivid "recollection" of
these meetings at trial was unreliable, at least. As
Christopher testified, at no time did Elton or Laub comment
that the construction estimates were too high. R 329,
R 478-79. The trial court was well within its province when it
rejected the testimony of Elton and Laub and made its finding
that the August 2, 1982 agreement was accepted and that Elton
and Laub authorized Brixen and Christopher to proceed in
accordance with it.
4

The schematic design phase provided for in the original
contract did not continue into the fall, see, e.g., R 315-318,
-8-

with the Wolf Creek employees and with Great Basin Engineering,
who had been hired by Wolf Creek for the master site planning
of all resort facilities.

[R 162-63, R 172, R 178-82, R

186-88, R 190-92, R 196-98, R 201-02, R 266, R 269.]
12.

A check of Wolf Creek Resort to Brixen &

Christopher for $7,500.00, dated September 23, 1982, was signed
by Laub.

Although Laub assumed that it was delivered to Brixen

& Christopher, it was not.5

(Footnote 4 cont.)
as Elton suggests. Brief of Elton and Laub at 8-9 (para. 28).
When Christopher proposed the amendment to raise the total fee,
he simply proportioned the $8,000 total fee increase among all
four phases, including the schematic design phase. R 363. The
fee increase was due to increased engineering consultant fees,
R 201, and part of the rationale for adding part to the
schematic design phase was that some of the work responsible
for the increased engineering consultant fees was "schematic
design" in the eyes of the engineers. R 349. But as
Christopher testified, Hwe had completed structural schematics
in our initial work prior to the end of July. Then his [the
engineer's] work starts, and he will call it schematics, but
it's unrelated to what we do as part of our agreement under
schematics." R 349. The assertion by Elton that the schematic
design phase continued into the fall is disingenuous, because
not only did he and Laub receive a bill in the summer for
completion of the schematic design phase based on their
approval, R 278, ex. 1 (page 91), but they even prepared a
check in September 1982 to pay the bill. R 461-62, ex. 45.
5

From the time of his deposition to the time of trial,
Laub went from assuming that the check had been delivered,
R 460-62, to claiming that (1) the check had been purposely
withheld "for delivery to Brixen & Christopher to pay for the
first phase at the time it became acceptable," see Brief of
Elton and Laub at 9 (para. 30), and (2) that he had told
Christopher this, R 465. In light of Laub's conflicting
deposition testimony and the contrary testimony of Christopher,
R 474, the trial court properly made this finding in favor of
Brixen & Christopher and further found that Elton and Laub
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13.
Christopher:

On about September 30, 1982, Brixen &
(1) issued a statement to Elton and Laub for a

fee then due of $10,000.00, $7,500.00 of which represented the
July 29, 1982 statement and $2,500.00 of which represented the
partial completion of design development and contract documents
for the bid package for site excavation and preparation, and
(2) sent Elton and Laub a letter updating them on progress on
the project.
14.

[R 187, R 278, ex. 1 (pages 90, 48-47)].
On October 4, 1982, Christopher delivered a bid

package, including drawings and specifications for site work,
to Wolf Creek employees.

These documents were distributed to

contractors to invite bids. About October 11, 1982, bids were
received by Wolf Creek for the site work, one of which was
favorable in that it was below the estimate.

[R 188-93, R 477,

ex. 1 (page 97)].
15.

By letter dated November 26, 1982, and pursuant

to a prior telephone conversation between Elton and
Christopher, Christopher sent Elton and Laub an amendment to
the August 2 letter agreement to reflect increased
architectural fees based on increased consulting fees required

(Footnote 5 cont.)
never objected to the statements for services billed by Brixen
& Christopher. R 56 (findings of fact, para. 21).
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for structural and mechanical engineering design.6

The letter

requested review of the amendment and execution if the
amendment was acceptable.

Elton and Laub neither executed the

amendment nor communicated their acceptance of the amendment7

6

The "note" of Elton about Brixen & Christopher's proposal
for increased compensation, Brief of Elton and Laub at 6 (para.
18), is gratuitous because Brixen & Christopher has not
appealed the trial court's ruling that the proposed amendment
was not accepted. Elton is dead wrong in claiming that the
judgment includes $8,500.00 for the schematic design phase,
$1,000.00 more than the original $7,500.00 fee based on the
allocation proposed in the amendment. See Brief of Elton and
Laub at 17. The court's ruling is crystal clear in excluding
from the judgment "the additional $8,000.00 fee" that was
proposed by the amendment. R 503-04. What the court did in
fact is award an amount based on allocating a total $71,500.00
fee between on the one hand completion of the first and second
phase and partial completion of the third phase and, on the
other hand, the remainder of the third phase and all of the
fourth phase. The precise basis for the trial court's
calculation was not stated and defendants never objected or
requested clarification in the trial court.
If anything, the trial court's allocation understated the
amount to which Brixen and Christopher was entitled because,
according to the allocation in the August 2 letter, Brixen and
Christopher performed at least 69.4% (($16,500.00 + $25,500.00)
/ $60,500.00) of the work comprising the second, third and
fourth phases. Since the amount attributable to the last three
phases is $64,000.00 ($71,500.00 - $7,500.00), the total award
to Brixen & Christopher on a strictly proportionate basis for
all work performed would be almost $52,000.00 ((69.4% of
$64,000.00) + $7,500.00 = $51,916.00), about $1,500 more than
the $50,500 awarded.
7

Elton misstates the testimony when he claims that
"Christopher . . . admitted that everything was conditional" in
November 1982. Brief of Elton and Laub at 8 (para. 26).
Christopher merely agreed with counsel for Elton and Laub that
the proposed amendment, which Christopher had discussed with
Elton by telephone, was conditional, not that "everything" was
(Footnote 7 continued on next page.)
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Enclosed with the letter was a statement dated November 26,
1982 for $27,500.00, which represented compensation for
completion of the programming and schematic design phase and
the design development phase as revised by the amendment.8
[R 278-79, ex. 42.]
16.

Architectural work on the project continued.

On

January 17, 1983, Brixen & Christopher issued a statement for
$57,500.00 in accordance with the August 2, 1986 letter

(Footnote 7 continued.)
conditional. R 344. As noted above, as the trial court found,
the terms of the August 2 letter agreement already had been
accepted even though Elton and Laub neglected to sign it as
Elton had promised. R 53 (findings of fact, para. 8), R 321.
8

From this billing alone, Elton and Laub knew that Brixen
& Christopher had completed the design development phase. The
assertion of Elton that Brixen & Christopher did not properly
provide cost estimates is unfounded. The contract does not
require Ma detailed breakdown of costs*1 in the first phase, see
Brief of Elton and Laub at 7 (para. 21), but rather **a
Statement of Probable Cost based on current area, volume or
other unit costs." Ex. 1 (page 32) (emphasis added). This
statement based on area was provided, inter alia, in the August
2 letter, which referred to the "construction estimate of
$897,750 (19,950 square feet at $45.00) plus site development
costs of $295,000 as estimated by Maas & Grassli.** Ex. 1 (page
34.) Elton acknowledges further that a "detailed breakdown of
costs of the Project** was prepared in October 1982 and
submitted to Elton and Laub, Brief of Elton and Laub at 7
(para. 21), which was in the second phase, "design
development." Contrary to Elton's claim that "Christopher
admitted that Elton was concerned about the cost estimate
submitted in October, 1982," Brief of Elton and Laub at 7
(para. 22), Christopher testified that he did not believe that
Elton ever expressed any concern about the cost estimate. R
329. As would be the case with any project, Christopher
acknowledged only that there was a general concern throughout
about keeping costs down. R 329.
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agreement as amended by the November 26 amendment.

The

statement was based on the $27,500.00 prior statement for the
first two phases and $30,000.00 for 85% completion of the third
phase, the construction documents phase.

By this time, Brixen

& Christopher had completed the first two phases, 85% or more
of the third phase and some work on the fourth phase in
connection with the site work bid package.9

[R 266-69, ex. 1

(pages 92 & 79)].
17.

Based on the August 2, 1982 letter agreement and

the extent of the services performed, Brixen & Christopher is
entitled to payment in the amount of $50,500.00.

[R 504-05;

see supra note 6].
18.

By telephone conversation with Elton on January

17, 1983, Christopher asked Elton for payment.

9

Elton said that

Brixen & Christopher did not merely, as Elton states,
"allegedly" perform work to this extent. Brief of Elton and
Laub at 9 (para. 31). Brixen & Christopher proved at
trial by substantial documentary and testimonial evidence,
including dozens of drawings renderings, and prints, that it
actually did work to this extent and the trial court
accordingly so found. Elton's position that Brixen &
Christopher was catering to every whim of Wolf Creek (Elton,
Laub, and staff), spending over 2,000 hours of architectural
staff time, and incurring expenses of over $25,000 for
engineering, R 284-88, ex. 10, in a never-ending effort to earn
a mere $7,500 gross fee is meritless. It is true that, as
Elton points out, Brief of Elton and Laub at 9 (para. 31), they
did not, despite their promises to do so, sign and return the
August 2, 1982 agreement, R 321, or pay Brixen & Christopher, R
200-201, R 266, R 273-276. Brixen & Christopher can hardly be
faulted for having believed that Elton and Laub would keep
their word.

-13-

he was ill, but would try to facilitate payment.

[R 266, ex. 1

(page 79)] .
19.

By letter dated February 23, 1983, Elton

authorized a change to an alternative mechanical system design
after being informed of estimated costs and benefits of the
proposed alternative system.
20.

[R 272-73, ex. 1 (pages 84-80)].10

Due to lack of payment, architectural work on the

project gradually came to a halt.

10

[R 273, ex. 10].

This letter is one example of communications of Elton
that refute the groundless conclusion that "[a]11 of Elton's
communications after August 2, 1982 to Brixen & Christopher
. . . were consistent with Elton and Laub's understanding that
Brixen & Christopher was allegedly trying to provide an
acceptable [schematic] design.M Brief of Elton and Laub at
9-10 (para. 32). In the letter, Elton shows awareness that the
project would soon be entering the fourth phase, the bidding
and negotiation phase, when he states in his February 23, 1983
letter: "When Wolf Creek goes to bid on the Recreation Center,
we should have incorporated the mechanical systems change you
discussed with Scott." Ex. 1 (page 84) (emphasis added).
Elton hardly could have thought otherwise because (1) the
February 8, 1983 letter of Christopher, to which Elton was
responding, informed Elton that changing the mechanical system
would require $4,380 in "redesign feesH, ex. 1 (page 83-82)
(emphasis added); (2) Elton had received the January 17, 1983
bill that indicated the contract or construction documents were
85% complete or, in other words, that the first and second
phases were complete and the third phase was nearly complete, R
268, ex. 1 (page 92); (3) Elton had been told when Christopher
gave him a status report on January 17, 1983 that the contract
documents were nearly complete and ready for bidding, R 266,
ex. 1 (page 79); (4) Elton had known at least since receiving
Brixen & Christopher's November 26, 1983 statement that, as the
statement indicated, the second phase was complete, R 278-79,
ex. 42; (5) Elton had been informed by Christopher's November
26, 1983 letter that the statement covered "services to date
through completion of Design Development." Ex. 1 (page 77);
ex. 42. Like Elton's February 23, 1983 letter, his other
letters belie his claims. On October 11, 1982, Elton wrote
Laub:
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21.

Throughout the project, Brixen & Christopher kept

Elton and Laub informed of progress with the design and was
never told in substance that (1) its work was going too far, or
(2) its statements for services were not acceptable.

[R 266, R

269, R 273, R 276, R 278-89, R 464].

(Footnote 10 continued.)
Enclosed are two copies of the Christopher
Recreation Center proposal he would like to have
signed.
Please advise if you have questions.
R 426-27, ex. 43.
wrote Laub:

The next day, October 12, 1982, Elton again

Jim Christopher called concerning the
whereabouts of his contractual agreement and payment
of services.
He has not paid Grassli because he has not
received monies from us.
R 426-27, ex. 44. There is no hint in the letters of any
objection being expressed to Christopher that he should not
expect the agreement to be signed and returned or the payment
to be made. Christopher's request for the agreement and
payment and Elton's acquiescence in early October also casts
grave doubt on Laub's "memory" at trial, contrary to his
deposition testimony, R 463-64, that he told Christopher just
days before that the agreement would not be signed and payment
would not be made.
Elton's December 1, 1986 letter to Laub serves to
further impeach the testimony of Elton. In the letter he
states:
Enclosed, for your information, is the Recreation
Center architectural contract on Wolf Creek, together
with a change order. I am not sure the change order
(Footnote 10 continued on next page.)

-15-

22.

There was no term of the parties' agreement that

provided that the agreement was not to be performed within one
year from the making of the agreement.

In other words, the

agreement could have been performed in one year.

Also, Brixen

& Christopher had partially performed the agreement.
23.

On March 2, 1983, after receiving Elton's

February 23 letter, Christopher spoke to Elton by telephone.
Elton agreed that payment to Brixen & Christopher was long
overdue.

Elton told Christopher that he and Laub were

expecting a $500,000.00 cash investment.
payment was needed that week.

Elton said that he would call

Laub and then call Christopher back.
24.

Christopher said the

[R 273, ex. 1 (page 85)].

On March 4, 1983, Elton called Christopher back.

He told Christopher that the extra $500,00.00 cash was coming
soon and that the money should be in First Security Bank by the
middle of next week.

Elton promised the payment would be made

(Footnote 10 continued.)
is justified. Could you have Clair [Cox] or Scott [Allen]
[Wolf Creek employees] make a determination?
Ex. 42 (emphasis added). Elton had a question only about the
change order, which the trial court found was ultimately not
accepted, not about "the Recreation Center architectural
contract," which the trial court found, based on abundant
evidence, was accepted. Similarly, Elton enclosed with the
letter a copy of Christopher's November 26 letter and the
accompanying bill without taking any exception to the fact that
they reflected that the design development phase had been
completed.
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immediately/ no later than March 14 or 15.

[R 273-74, ex. 1

(page 85)].
25.
Reno.

On April 16, 1983, Christopher visited Elton in

Elton told Christopher that financing was close and that

interest would be paid on the amount outstanding.

Elton also

told Christopher that he was pleased with the work of Brixen &
Christopher.11
26.

[R 275-76, ex. 1 (page 88)].
No payment was ever made to Brixen &

Christopher's for the architectural work it performed on the
Wolf Creek Recreation Center.

[R 274].

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED BRIXEN &
CHRISTOPHER JUDGMENT BASED ON THE AUGUST 2, 1982
LETTER AGREEMENT.

The trial court judgment is consistent with the
parties' contract.

The transcript of the court's ruling and

its findings and conclusions reflect a cogent application of
the August 2 letter agreement and lend no support to the

11

Even after Laub had answered the complaint in March 1984
and denied "that defendents Laub or Elton entered into an
agreement or employment contract with plaintiff [Brixen &
Christopher]," R 13, Laub met regarding payment with
Christopher and the other firm principal, Martin Brixen, on
July 27, 1984 at the offices of Brixen & Christopher.
R 279-81, R 476-77. As reflected in Christopher's two pages of
notes, ex. 1, pages 98-97, Laub said he was in financial
trouble but did not deny that the money was due Brixen &
Christopher. R 280-81. Laub did not contradict Christopher's
testimony about this meeting.
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rhetorical charge of Elton that the trial court sought to
"ignore" or "remake" the contract.

Brixen & Christopher did

everything necessary to earn the amounts awarded by the trial
court.

As found by the trial court, Elton and Laub were

completely aware of the extent of work being performed by
Brixen & Christopher, authorized the work to the full extent
that it was performed, and admitted to Brixen & Christopher
their liability for services performed.
POINT II. ELTON IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT BRIXEN &
CHRISTOPHER'S SERVICES WERE AUTHORIZED.
In light of Brixen & Christopher's dutiful
communication of progress throughout the project and the
complete absence of any objection by Elton and Laub to Brixen &
Christopher's statements about the extent to which the work had
been performed and the extent to which compensation had been
earned, Elton's attempt to raise the technical objection that
approval lacked sufficient formality is unwarranted.

Elton and

Laub urged Brixen & Christopher onward, and silently accepted
Brixen & Christopher's reports and billings throughout the
project as Brixen & Christopher performed.
escape liability would be grossly unfair.
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To permit Elton to

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED BRIXEN &
CHRISTOPHER JUDGMENT BASED ON THE AUGUST 2, 1982
LETTER AGREEMENT.

The trial court did not "remake" or "ignore- the
parties' contract/ as Elton asserts, and it would have had to
have done so in order to absolve Elton of his responsibility to
pay Brixen & Christopher for its architectural services.
Brixen & Christopher was retained for the first "schematic
design" phase in March 1982.

Brixen & Christopher documented

this in writing to Elton and Laub.

This phase was completed

and approved at the end of July 1982.

Brixen & Christopher

documented this in writing to Elton & Laub and billed for the
completion of the schematic design phase.

Ex. 1 (pages 34-33).

Next, Brixen & Christopher proceeded with the second
"design development" phase.

Working closely with the Wolf

Creek staff as instructed, and keeping Elton and Laub informed
every step of the way, Brixen & Christopher billed Elton and
Laub for progress on the design development phase at the end of
September 1982. Ex. 1 (page 90). Elton and Laub also had to
know that design development was in progress at this point
because of the involvement of the engineering consultants. R
362, ex. 1 (page 32, paragraph 1.2.1, see sections 1.1 and 1.2
and pages 48-45).

The design development documents were

completed and approved in November 1982.

Brixen & Christopher

documented this in writing to Elton and Laub and billed for
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services rendered through the completion of the design
development phase.

Exs. 1 (page 77) & 42. When the project

finally ground to a halt because Elton and Laub failed to pay
the amounts outstanding, the third "construction documents"
phase was nearly complete and Brixen & Christopher had incurred
expenses of over $25/000 for the work of engineering
consultants.

The trial court awarded Brixen & Christopher the

amounts that it had earned based on services to the extent that
they were rendered.
Time and again, over and over, by letters, documented
telephone calls, meetings, and billings, Elton and Laub were
told every step of the way what was happening and what had been
accomplished.

Elton and Laub regularly not only observed the

progress but pushed Brixen & Christopher to move ahead.

In

addition, they were continually involved in the project through
the Wolf Creek staff.

Never did Elton and Laub object to the

work of Brixen & Christopher; on the contrary, they praised the
work.

Never did Elton and Laub object to the billings; on the

contrary, they promised to pay and expressed embarrassment over
the lack of payment.

It is readily apparent from the portions

of the record cited above in support of the trial court's
findings of fact that the judgment in favor of Brixen &
Christopher is well-grounded in the evidence.

The mystery is

not why the trial court decided in favor of Brixen &
Christopher, but how Elton could have expected otherwise.
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Elton's argument is mostly surplusage.

First, Elton

argues that the court must enforce the contract as made.
Unfortunately for Elton, the trial court did exactly that.
Second, Elton's claims about Brixen & Christopher's
alleged failure to obtain approvals is wholly lacking in
substance.

With regard to the schematic design phase, Elton

merely expresses disappointment with the trial court's
determination that the schematic design phase was approved at
the meeting on July 28, 1982, but he grudgingly admits that the
trial court could properly so find on "disputed evidence."

See

Brief of Elton and Laub at 15. Elton's observation that the
third "construction documents" phase was never approved adds
nothing.

First, it is not quite true.

Not only did Wolf Creek

approve of the construction documents for the site work, but it
put the job out for bid based on those construction documents.
Second, the rest of the construction documents were not
approved because, due to Elton and Laub's failure to pay, they
were never completed.

Accordingly, the trial court awarded

compensation to Brixen & Christopher based on 85%, rather than
100%, completion of the third phase.
In maintaining that the second "design development"
phase was not approved, Elton quotes part of an answer but,
without any indication of the omission, deletes the part of the
answer that undercuts his claim.

Compare Brief of Elton and

Laub at 16 with R 365 (lines 1-3). Christopher's testimony
was, in substance, that no "formal" approval was obtained, but
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design and development documents were submitted, see R 364, and
the approval came in the form of "a second of what we were
doing,M R 365. As Christopher explained:
this is the way projects work. It's a normal flow of
information. And your approvals came by having
meetings. And you keep going — you say, Hyes, that's
fine, keep going." And we had numerous meetings in
this case as we do in all cases, just a normal flow of
corroboration and information between architects and
client representatives.
R 369-70. William Browning, an architect and expert witness,
explained that in practice approvals may come in such simple
discussions.

R 384. The contract required nothing more and

did not impose any restrictions on the manner in which the
approval could be given.

The contract did require Elton and

Laub to notify Brixen & Christopher in writing of any fault in
the project.

Ex. 1 (pages 31-30, section 2.9).

Elton and Laub

never notified Brixen & Christopher, in writing or otherwise,
that it was going too far or that any of Brixen & Christopher's
many writings were incorrect,

If Elton and Laub in fact

believed there was some further technical requirement to
approval and that they were not approving the design
development phase, events would not have transpired as they
did.

Elton and Laub would not have passively stood by without

objection when Christopher referred to the completion of the
design development phase in his November 26, 1987 letter and
included with the letter a statement for services rendered
through completion of the second "design development" phase.
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When Christopher sought payment because the construction
documents were nearly complete, Elton would not have said he
would facilitate payment.

When Christopher persisted in

seeking payment, Elton would not have promised to pay interest.
Elton states that Christopher admitted that Laub
objected to the schematic design submitted on July 28, 1982 and
that Laub was concerned about costs exceeding a limitation
established in March 1982.

Both claims are wrong.

Christopher

testified that, even though Laub requested certain refinements,
the design was approved and Brixen & Christopher was instructed
to proceed.

Christopher also testified that the design

presented at the July 28, 1982 meeting already had undergone
much client review and refinement, "which was really beyond
schematic.H

R 313.

Likewise, Christopher testified that the

projected costs were in line with the budget that had been
established by Laub, and further that neither Elton nor Laub
objected to the cost estimates.

R 328-30, R 478-79.

Elton is also wrong when he states that Christopher's
testimony was that the change in the mechanical system was part
of design development.

As the mechanical engineer testified,

construction design of the mechanical system was complete and
ready to bid, R 224-25, when the Wolf Creek staff decided to
consider changing to a substantially different type of
mechanical system utilizing heat pumps.

R 269-73.

Thus, the

mechanical system was not only past the second "design
development" phase, but the work for the third "construction
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document" phase had been completed so far as the mechanical
system was concerned.

The fallacy in Elton's reasoning is that

he assumes that the fact a change is being made is indicative
of the phase of the project being worked on.

To the contrary,

changes can be made at any time, whether in the schematic
design phase, the design development phase, the construction
document phase, or after the project has been bid and the
construction has begun.

See R 158, R 316-17, ex. 1 (pages

32-31, para. 1.5.14 & section 1.7, paras. 1.7.12 & .13) (change
orders during final "construction administration" phase).
Elton had been told that the construction documents were nearly
complete on January 17, 1983, and Brixen & Christopher had then
billed based on 85% completion of the construction documents.
Thus, Elton had no reason to be surprised that changing the
mechanical system would require additional redesign fees, ex. 1
(page 83), and he implicitly accepted the cost of those fees
and seemed to acknowledge that construction documents were
about ready for bid when he wrote Christopher on February 23,
1983:

"When Wolf Creek goes to bid on the Recreation Center,

we should have incorporated the mechanical systems change you
discussed with Scott."

Ex. 1 (page 84).

Brixen & Christopher kept its side of the bargain but
finally pulled off the project when it became clear that Elton
and Laub were not making good on their promises to pay for the
services rendered.

The trial court properly awarded judgment

for the work performed.
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POINT II. ELTON IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT BRIXEN &
CHRISTOPHER'S SERVICES WERE AUTHORIZED.
Elton and Laub not only were informed of the progress
on the project every step of the way, but they urged Brixen &
Christopher on.

This case presents a textbook example of

circumstances appropriate for application of equitable
estoppel.

"The elements of equitable estoppel are:

'conduct

by one party which leads another party, in reliance thereon, to
adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or damage if
the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct.1

United

American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First National Bank, Utah,
641 P.2d 158, 161 (1982) (footnote omitted).-

Blackhurst v.

Transamerica Insurance Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985).
Estoppel may be based on a party's "silence when he ought to
speak."

Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1980.).

Even if, contrary to the findings of the trial court, Brixen &
Christopher had not obtained approvals and did not have
authority to proceed as it did, Elton is estopped due to the
utter failure of Elton and Laub to do anything at all to
communicate to Brixen & Christopher their alleged dispute with
(1) the July 1982 statement for services; (2) the August 2,
1982 letter of Christopher; (3) the September 30, 1982
statement for services; (4) the October 4, 1982 bid package for
grading and site work; (5) the November 2, 1982 letter of
Christopher; (6) the November 26, 1982 letter of Christopher;
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(7) the November 26, 1982 statement for services; (8) the
January 17, 1983 statement for services.12
For over six months after the July 28, 1982 meeting
when Brixen & Christopher was given authorization to go forward
with the project^ Elton and Laub let Brixen & Christopher
proceed full speed ahead.

Far from holding back work on the

recreation center, Elton and Laub were anxious for the work to
go forward so they could use progress on the recreation center
as a selling point for marketing condominiums in the Wolf Creek
development.

R 166, R 172-73. As recorded in Christopher's

August 2, 1982 letter, Elton and Laub planned Hto initiate
construction as soon as possible."

Ex. 1 (pages 34-33).

In

his September 20, 1982 letter, Christopher recognized their
"desire for an early construction start,N but recommended that
fall construction include only grading and site work based on
recent soils reports and discussions with the structural
engineer and the soils engineer.

Ex. 1 (pages 46-45).

And far

from disapproving in any way the design that had been
submitted, Wolf Creek used artistic renderings of the design to
promote sales of condominium units.

R 167, R 170-71, R 175, R

475-76.

12

Although waiver is a concept distinct from estoppel,
Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983), the estoppel
here encompasses waiver also because even if the contract had
required more in the way of approval, Elton waived the
condition Hby receiving further performance from the other
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Wolf Creek's conduct when the final plans and
specifications for the site work were delivered was also
inconsistent with the position Elton now takes.13

Laub was at

Wolf Creek on October 4, 1982 when the package was
hand-delivered by Christopher.

After meeting with the Wolf

Creek staff, Christopher told Laub that he had delivered the
package and talked to Laub about whether Laub wanted to go
ahead with the site work that fall.

The bid package was not

only accepted, but it was let out for bid and a favorable bid
was obtained from a firm called Terra Ferma.14

R 192-93.

Elton cannot rely on the rule that a party acting with
knowledge may not claim estoppel.

Nothing is more apparent

from the record in this case than that Brixen & Christopher
believed based on the conduct of Elton and Laub that it was

(Footnote 12 continued.)
party, with knowledge that the condition ha[d] not been
performed." 3A A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 755 at 497
(1960) (footnote omitted). The reliance of Brixen &
Christopher Hjustifies the added description of estoppel." Id.
§ 752 at 481 (footnote omitted).
13

As reflected in the August 2, 1982 letter agreement, the
work was to include three bidding packages: (1) site
preparation and excavation; (2) reinforced concrete; and (3)
general architectural, mechanical, electrical, and site
development. (Ex. 1 (page 33).
14

Laub denied at trial that he knew that the package had
been bid, but he recalled it being bid and who the low bidder
was when he met with Brixen & Christopher on July 27, 1983, as
Christopher's notes of that meeting reflect. R 476-77, ex. 1
(pages 98-97).
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authorized to proceed as it did.

On appeal, Elton has dropped

his erroneous claim made and rejected in the trial court, that
the parties' contract violated the statute of frauds, but has
recast the claim in a new form.

He contends that the attempts

of Brixen & Christopher to get he and Laub to sign the contract
that had been agreed to orally and acted upon indicates that
Brixen & Christopher believed that work past the first
••schematic design** phase was not authorized.

On the contrary,

it merely shows that Brixen & Christopher wanted the agreement
that had been reached to be evidenced by a writing signed by
Elton and Laub.

The mistake in Elton's logic is convincingly

shown, to take one example, by the fact that he claims
Christopher's September 30 and November 26, 1982 letters show
that Brixen & Christopher knew the first •'schematic design"
phase was not approved when the letters actually show that
progress on the job had progressed beyond the mere initial
outline stage and statements for services beyond the schematic
design phase accompanied both letters.
At all times, Elton, Laub, and their Wolf Creek staff
did nothing but give Brixen & Christopher the green light.
Based on the statements and conduct of Elton and Laub, which
Brixen & Christopher confirmed in writing many times, Brixen &
Christopher expended over 2,000 hours of architectural staff
time and incurred expense of over $25,000 for work by
consulting engineers.

It is unfair for Elton to try now to
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repudiate his agreement to compensate Brixen & Christopher and
to repudiate their actions that led Brixen & Christopher to
spend its time and money to provide extensive, substantially
complete architectural design services.

CONCLUSION
This brief is filed only as to appellant Elton as
appellant Laub has filed bankruptcy.

The trial court correctly

concluded that Elton agreed to pay for all of the services
performed by Brixen & Christopher and, alternatively, that it
would be inequitable to permit Elton to escape liability by
repudiating their conduct in acquiescing in and contributing to
the continuous work on the architectural design.

The trial

court judgment against Elton should be affirmed.
DATED:

October 8, 1987.
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 8, 1987, a copy of
the Brief of Respondent Brixen & Christopher Architects was
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Walter P. Faber, Jr.
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84019
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
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ADDENDUM

March 4, 1982 letter from Christopher to Elton
and Laub. Ex. 1 (pages 3-1).
July 29/ 1982 statement from Brixen & Christopher
to Elton and Laub. Ex. 1 (page 91).
August 2/ 1982 letter from Christopher to Elton
and Laub. Ex. 1 (pages 34-30).
September 23/ 1982 check to Brixen & Christopher
from Wolf Creek Properties. Ex. 45.
September 30, 1982 letter from Christopher to
Elton and Laub. Ex. 1 (pages 48-47).
September 30, 1982 statement from Brixen &
Christopher to Elton and Laub. Ex. 1 (page 90).
October 4, 1982 transmittal from Brixen &
Christopher to Clair Cox of Wolf Creek Country
Club Resort. Ex. 1 (page 50).
October 4, 1982 notes of Christopher.
(page 49).

Ex. 1

December 1/ 1982 letter from Elton to Laub
enclosing:
(1) November 26/ 1982 letter from
Christopher to Elton; and
(2) November 26/ 1982 statement from Brixen
& Christopher to Elton. Ex. 42 (first 3
pages).
January 17/ 1983 statement from Brixen &
Christopher to Elton. Ex. 1 (page 92).
January 17/ 1983 notes of Christopher.
(page 79).

Ex. 1

February 18/ 1983 letter from Christopher to
Elton. Ex. 1 (page 83-82).

February 23, 1983 letter from Elton to
Christopher. Ex. 1 (page 84).
March 2 & 4, 1983 notes of Christopher.
April 16/ 1983 notes of Christopher.
October 17, 1983 notes of Christopher.
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/

March 4 ,

1982

RECEIVED
MAR 1C 1582

Messrs. Roger H. Elton and
John H. Laub
Attorneys at Law
3900 North Wolf Creek Drive
Eden# Utah 84 310

B h l X ^ : & CHRISTOPHER
ARCHITECTS

Gentlemen:
We enjoyed meeting with you yesterday to discuss your
planned recreational building at Wolf Creek Country Club
Resort, Eden, Utah.
We are very pleased that we will be working with you on
the project, and have included as Attachment MAM to the
letter, the Scope of Services that we will perform as
outlined in the February 24, 1982 letter to you from
Maas Grassli and Associates. We understand that this
initial agreement will be to perform Programming and
Schematic Design services only, until authorized by you
to continue with the project.
Our fee for complete basic architectural services would be
based upon 6% of the construction cost of the work designed
or specified by our firm, or our fee could be by another
negotiated procedure (hourly, fixed fee, etc.) if you so
preferred.
We feel that this is a very important project for the
Wold Creek Resort and we are certain that we will be able
to develop an outstanding solution.

<V % <C ^> $

Messrs. Roger H. Elton and
John H. Laub

Page 2

Your signatures of approval below will serve as Qur notice
to proceed with Programming and Schematic Design.. Please
return one of these three signed letters of agreement to
us for our records, the other two being for each of you.
Sincerely,

-•flames W. C h r i s t o p h e r FAIA
' JWC/je
Encl.

Approved:

3/,,/f;
Roger H. Eylton

Date

John H

Datd

/

s±

tvv I

:

RFCE!VED

SCOPE OF SERVICES

., r _, . _ , ™
TOPHER
ARCHITECTS

I.

. Programming and Schematic Design Phase:
• •

•

»

'

Program requirements are reviewed/developed with the client to .'
insure*an accurate statement of needs and budget. Site design
and architectural studies are prepared to indicate possible *
solutions to the problem and then, with the approval of the Owner,
a design is established for development. .Schematic drawings are
prepared showing the design/.including site plan, floor plans,
sections, elevations, and prespective«'
Our fee requirements for Phase I, Programming and Schematic
Design, would be on an hourly basis as follows:
B & C Principals
MGA Principals
Associates
Professionals
Staff.

$
$
$
$
$

50.00
40.00
35.00
30.00
15.00

Per
Per
Per
Per
Per

Hour
Hour
Hour
Hour
Hour

A limit or maximum fee for this phase of vork would be $7,500.00.
II.

ty- G &*<• *

Design Development Phase:

pyj'1'

Based upon the approved Schematic Design, detailed drawings
are developed, indicating materials, architectural, structural,
mechanical and electrical systems. At this time, a more precise
statement of probable construction cost Is developed.
III.

Construction Documents Phase: ,
Contract documents consisting of drawings and specifications
are prepared during this phase, setting forth, In detail, the
requirements for the construction of the project.

IV.

Bidding or Negotiation Phase:
Bids or negotiated proposals are received and the construction
contract is prepared and awarded to the.successful contractor.

V.

Construction Administration Phase:
The project is visited during the constriuction phase to track the
progress and quality of the work. Payment requests are reviewed
and approved, change orders initiated, shop drawings reviewed,
and other administrative matters attended to as required.

ATTACHMENT

"A"

issrs Roger H. Elton and
>hn H. Laub
>00 North Wolf Creek Drive
len, Utah 84310

r MENT

ily 29, 1982
u n p l e t i o n o f Programming and Schematic Design Phase
'hase I ) f o r t h e d e s i g n o f t h e Wolf Creek R e c r e a t i o n
i n t e r p e r L e t t e r o f Agreement d a t e d March 4, 1 9 8 2 .
f o u r l y f e e s e x c e e d e d a g r e e d upon l i m i t of
IOUNT DUE:

$7f500.00)

August 2, 1982

Messrs* Roger H. Elton and
John H. Laub
Attorneys at Law
3900 North Wolf Creek Drive
Eden, Utah 84 310
Gentlemen:
We are pleased that you have elected to proceed with the
architectural work on the Wolf Creek Recreation Center in
anticipation of an early construction start.
This letter, which is in accordance with our former agreement of March 4, 1982 will serve as a Letter of Agreement
between you and our firm for architectural services for the
project.
Our fixed fee for basic architectural services will be $71,500
based upon our construction estimate of $897,750 (19,950
square feet at $45.00) plus site development costs of $295,000
as estimated by Maas & Grassli.
Payments for architectural services will be phased according
to Attachment "A" of our March 4th agreement in the following
breakdown:
Phase I

- Schematic Design

$ 7,500.

Phase II

- Design Development

$16,500.

Phase III - Construction Documents
Phase IV

$30,000.

- Construction Administration $14,000.

We will issue statements to you monthly as our work progresses.

0O"3<

Messrs. Roger H. Elton and
John H. Laub

Page -2

In an effort to initiate construction as soon as
possible, we plan to issue our contract documents in
bidding packages as follows:
1.

Site preparation and excavation

2.

Reinforced concrete

3.

General architectural, mechanical, electrical,
and site development

It is our intent to bid the first two packages in time
for this work to be accomplished in the fall of 1982.
We will plan to issue the third bid package before the
end of December.
Attached to this letter, and as a part of this Agreement,
are the normal wTerms and Conditions of Agreement Between
Owner and Architect" from AIA Document B141. These
articles describe the services and responsibilities of
the Owner and Architect during the course of the project.
A signed copy of this letter will verify your approval
of this Agreement and serve as our notice to proceed with
the Design Development Phase.
Sincerely,

James W. Christopher, FAIA
JWC/je

Approval:

Roger H. Elton

John H. Laub
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TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF ACREEM ENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ARCHITECT
ARTICLE 1
ARCHITECT'S SERVICES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
BASIC SERVICES
The Architect's Basic Services consist of the live
phases described in Paragraphs 1.1 through 1.5 and
include normal structural, mechanical and electrical
engineering services and any other services included
in Article 15 as part of Basic Services.
1.1

SCHEMATIC DESIGN PHASE

1.1.1 The Architect shall review the program furnished
by the Owner to ascertain the requirements of the Project
and shall review the understanding of such requirements
with the Owner.
1.1.2 The Architect shall provide a preliminary evaluation of the program and the Project budget requirements,
each in terms of the other, subject to the limitations set
forth in Subparagraph 3.2.1.
1.1.3 The Architect shall review with the Owner alternative approaches to design and construction of the Project.
1.1.4 Based on the mutually agreed upon program and
Project budget requirements, the Architect shall prepare,
for approval by the Owner, Schematic Design Documents
consisting of drawings and other documents illustrating
the scale and relationship of Project components.
1.1.5 The Architect shall submit to the Owner a Statement of Probable Construction Cost based on current
area, volume or other unit costs.
1.2

DESICN DEVELOPMENT PHASE

1.2.1 Based on the approved Schematic Design Documents and any adjustments authorized by the Owner in
the program or Project budget, the Architect shall prepare, for approval by the Owner, Design Development
Documents consisting of drawings and other documents
to fix and describe the size and character of the entire
Project as to architectural, structural, mechanical and electrical systems, materials and such other elements as may
be appropriate.
1.2.2 The Architect shall submit to the Owner a further
Statement of Probable Construction Cost.

ments to previous Statements of Probable Construction
Cost indicated by changes in requirements or general
market conditions.
1.3.4 The Architect shall assist the Owner in connection
with the Owner's responsibility for filing documents required for the approval of governmental authorities having jurisdiction over the Project.
1.4

BIDDING OR NEGOTIATION PHASE

1.4.1 The Architect, following the Owner's approval of
the Construction Documents and of the latest Statement
of Probable Construction Cost, shall assist the Owner in
obtaining bids or negotiated proposals, and assist in
awarding and preparing contracts for construction.
1.5

CONSTRUCTION PHASE—ADMINISTRATION
OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

1.5.1 The Construction Phase will commence with the
award of the Contract for Construction and, together with
the Architect's obligation to provide Basic Services under
this Agreement, will terminate when final payment to the
Contractor is due, or in the absence of a final Certificate
for Payment or of such due date, sixty days after the Date
of Substantial Completion of the Work, whichever occurs
first.
1.5.2 Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement and
incorporated in the Contract Documents, the Architect
shall provide administration of the Contract for Construction as set forth below and in the edition of AIA Document A201, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, current as of the date of this Agreement.
1.5.3 The Architect shall be a representative of the
Owner during the Construction Phase, and shall advise
and consult with the Owner. Instructions to the Contractor shall be forwarded through the Architect. The Architect shall have authority to act on behalf of the Owner
only to the extent provided in the Contract Documents
unless otherwise modified by written instrument in accordance with Subparagraph 1.5.16.

1.3.1 Based on the approved Design Development Documents and any further adjustments in the scope or quality of the Project or in the Project budget authorized by
the Owner, the Architect shall prepare, for approval b>
the Owner, Construction Documents consisting of Drawings and Specifications setting forth in detail the requirements for the construction of the Project.

1.5.4 The Architect shall visit the site at intervals appropriate to the stage of construction or as otherwise
agreed by the Architect in writing to become generally
familiar with the progress and quality of the Work and to
determine in general if the Work is proceeding in accordance with the Contract Documents. However, the Architect shall not be required to make exhaustive or continuous on-site inspections to check the quality or quantity of the Work. On the basis of such on-site observations as an architect, the Architect shall keep the Owner
informed of the progress and quality of the Work, and
>hall endeavor to guard the Owner against defects and
deficiencies in the Work of the Contractor.

1.3.2 The Architect shall assist the Owner in the preparation of the necessary bidding information, bidding forms,
the Conditions of the Contract, and the form of Agreement between the Owner and the Contractor
1.3.3 The Architect shall advise the Owner of any adjust-

1.5.5 The Architect shall not have control or charge of
and shall not be responsible for construction means,
methods techniques, sequences or procedures, or for
saretv precautions and programs in connection with the
Work, for the acts or omissions of the Contractor, Sub-

1.3

CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENTS PHASE
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.>ntractor< or any other persons performing any of the
/ork. or for the failure of any of them to carry out the
/ork in accordance with the Contract Documents.
5.6 The Architect shall at all times have access to the
/ork wherever it is in preparation or progress.
5.7 The Architect shall determine the amounts owing
> the Contractor based on observations at the site and on
valuations of the Contractor's Applications for Payment,
id shall issue Certificates for Payment in such amounts.
> provided in the Contract Documents.
5.8 The issuance of a Certificate for Payment shall
Dnstitute a representation by the Architect to the Owner,
ased on the Architect's observations at the site as proided in Subparagraph 1.5.4 and on the data comprising
ie Contractor's Application for Payment, that the Work
as progressed to the point indicated; that, to the best of
">e Architect's knowledge, information and belief, the qually of the Work is in accordance with the Contract Documents (subject to an evaluation of the Work for conormance with the Contract'Documents upon Substantial
Completion, to the results of any subsequent tests rehired by or performed under the Contract Documents,
o minor deviations from the Contract Documents corectable prior to completion, and to any specific qualificaions stated in the Certificate for Payment); and that the
Zontractor is entitled to payment in the amount certified.
However, the issuance of a Certificate for Payment shall
iot be a representation that the Architect has made any
examination to ascertain how and for what purpose the
Contractor has used the moneys paid on account o\ the
Contract Sum.
1.5.9 The Architect shall be the interpreter of the requirements of the Contract Documents and the judge of
the performance thereunder by both the Owner and
Contractor. The Architect shall render interpretations necessary for the proper execution or progress of the Work
with reasonable promptness on written request of either
the Owner or the Contractor, and shall render written decisions, within a reasonable time, on alt claims, disputes
and other matters in question between the Owner and the
Contractor relating \o the execution or progress of the
Work or the interpretation of the Contract Documents.
1.5.10 Interpretations and decisions of the Architect shall
be consistent with the intent of and reasonably inferable
from the Contract Documents and shall be in written or
graphic form. In the capacity of interpreter and judge,
the Architect shall endeavor to secure faithful performance by both the Owner and the Contractor, shall not
show partiality to either, and shall not be liable for the
result of any interpretation or decision rendered in goad
faith in such capacity.
1.5.11 The Architect's decisions in matters relating to
artistic effect shall be final \i consistent with the intent of
the Contract Documents. The Architect's decisions on
any other claims, disputes or other matters, including
those in question between the Owner and the Contractor,
shall be subject to arbitration as provided in this Agreement and in the Contract Documents.
1.5.12 The Architect shall have authoritv to reject Work
which docs not conform to the Contract Documents.
Whenever, in the Architect's reasonable opinion, it i>

necessary or advisable for the implementation of the intent
of the Contract Documents, the Architect will have authority to require special inspection or testing of the Work in
accordance with the provisions of the Contract Documents, whether or not such Work be then fabricated, installed or completed.
1.5.13 The Architect shall review and approve or take
other appropriate action upon the Contractor's submittals
such as Shop Drawings, Product Data and Samples, but
only for conformance with the design concept of the
Work and with the information given in the Contract
Documents. Such action shall be taken with reasonable
promptness so as to cause no delay. The Architect's approval of a specific item shall not indicate approval of an
assembly of which the item is a component.
1.5.14 The Architect shall prepare Change Orders for
the Owner's approval and execution in accordance with
the Contract Documents,and shall have authority to order
minor changes in the Work not involving an adjustment
in the Contract Sum or an extension of the Contract Time
which are not inconsistent with the intent of the Contract
Documents.
• ..
1.5.15 The Architect shall conduct inspections to determine the Dates of Substantial Completion and final completion, shall receive and forward to the Owner for the
Owner's review written warranties and related documents
required by the Contract Documents and assembled by
the Contractor, and shall issue a final Certificate for Payment.
1.5.16 The extent of the duties, responsibilities and limitations of authority of the Architect as the Owner's representative during construction shall not be modified or
extended without written consent of the Owner, the Contractor and the Architect.
1.6

PROJECT REPRESENTATION BEYOND BASIC SERVICES

1.6.1 If the Owner and Architect agree that more extensive representation at the site than h described in
Paragraph 1.5 shall be provided, the Architect shall provide one or more Project Representatives to assist the
Architect in carrying out such responsibilities at the site.
1.6.2 Such Project Representatives shall be selected, employed and directed by the Architect, and the Architect
shall be compensated therefor as mutually agreed between the Owner and the Architect as set forth in an exhibit appended to this Agreement, which shall describe
the duties, responsibilities and limitations of authority of
such Project Representatives.
1.6.3 Through the observations by such Project Representatives, the Architect shall endeavor to provide further
protection for the Owner against defects and deficiencies
in the Work, but the furnishing of such project representation shall not modify the rights, responsibilities or obligations of the Architect as described in Paragraph 1.5.
1.7

ADDITIONAL SERVICES
The following Services are hot included in Basic
Services unless so identified in Article 15. They shall
be provided if authorized or confirmed in writing by
the Owner, and they shall be paid for by the Owner
as provided in this Agreement, in addition to the
compensation for Basic Services.
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struction, and rurni>hmg services as may be required in
connection with the replacement of such W o r k .
1.7.2 Providing
studies.

financial

feasibility

or

other

special

1.7.3 Providing planning surveys, site evaluations, environmental studies or comparative studies of prospective
sites, and preparing special surveys, studies and submissions required for approvals of governmental authorities
or others having jurisdiction over the Project.
1.7.4 Providing services relative to future facilities, systems and equipment w h i c h are not intended to be constructed d u r i n g the Construction Phase.
1.7.5 Providing services to investigate existing conditions
or facilities or to make measured drawings thereof, or to
verify the accuracy of drawings or other information furnished by the O w n e r .
1.7.6 Preparing documents of alternate, separate or
sequential bids or providing extra services in connection
w i t h b i d d i n g , negotiation or construction prior to the
c o m p l e t i o n of the Construction Documents Phase, when
requested by the Owner.
1.7.7 Providing coordination of Work performed
separate contractors or by the Owner's o w n forces

by

1.7.8 Providing services in connection w i t h the work ot
a construction manager or separate consultants retained
by the Owner.
1.7.9 Providing Detailed Estimates of Construction Cost,
analyses of o w n i n g and operating costs, or detailed quantity surveys or inventories of material, equipment and
labor.
1.7.10 Providing interior design and other similar services required for or in connection w i t h the selection,
procurement or installation of furniture, furnishings and
related equipment.
1.7.11 Providing services for planning tenant or rental
spaces.
1.7.12 Making revisions in Drawings, Specifications or
other documents when such revisions are inconsistent
w i t h written approvals or instructions previously given,
are required by the enactment or revision of codes, laws
or regulations subsequent to the preparation of such documents or are due to other causes not solely w i t h i n the
c o n t r o l of the Architect.
1.7.13 Preparing Drawings, Specifications and supporting
data and providing other services in connection w i t h
Change Orders to the extent that the adjustment in the
Basic Compensation resulting from the adjusted Construction Cost is not commensurate w i t h the services req u i r e d of the Architect, provided such Change Orders are
required by causes not solely within the control of the
Architect.
1.7.14 Making investigations, surveys, valuations, inventories or detailed appraisals of existing facilities, and services required in connection w i t h construction performed
by the O w n e r .
1.7.15 Providing consultation concerning replacement of
any W o r k damaged by fire or other cause during con-

1.7.16 Providing services made necessary by the default
of the Contractor, or by major defects or deficiencies in
the Work of the Contractor, or by failure of performance
of either the Owner or Contractor under the Contract for
Construction.
1.7.17 Preparing a
showing significant
construction based
other data furnished

set of reproducible record drawings
changes in the W o r k made during
on marked-up prints, drawings and
by the Contractor to the Architect.

1.7.18 Providing extensive assistance in the utilization of
any equipment or system such as initial start-up o r testing,
adjusting and balancing, preparation of operation and
maintenance manuals, training personnel for operation
and maintenance, and consultation during operation.
1.7.19 Providing services after issuance to the O w n e r of
the final Certificate for Payment, or in the absence of a
final Certificate for Payment, more than sixty days after
the Date of Substantial Completion of the W o r k .
1.7.20 Preparing to serve or serving as in expert witness
in connection w i t h any public hearing, arbitration proceeding or legal proceeding.
1.7.21 Providing services of consultants for other than
the normal architectural, structural, mechanical and electrical engineering services for the Project.
1.7.22 Providing any other services not otherwise i n cluded in this Agreement or not customarily furnished in
accordance w i t h generally accepted architectural practice.
1.8

TIME

1.8.1 The Architect shall perform Basic and A d d i t i o n a l
Services as expeditiously as is consistent w i t h professional
skill and care and the orderly progress of the W o r k . Upon
request of the Owner, the Architect shall submit for the
Owner's approval, a schedule for the performance of the
Architect's services which shall be adjusted as required as
the Project proceeds, and shall include allowances for periods of time required for the Owner's review and approval
of submissions and for approvals of authorities having
jurisdiction over the Project. This schedule, w h e n approved
by the Owner, shall not, except for reasonable cause, be
exceeded by the Architect.
ARTICLE 2
THE OWNER'S

RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 The O w n e r shall provide full information regarding
requirements for trVe Project including a p r o g r a m , w h i c h
shall set forth the Owner's design objectives, constraints
and criteria, including space requirements and relationships, flexibility and expandability, special e q u i p m e n t and
systems and site requirements.
2.2 If the Owner provides a budget for the Project it
shall include contingencies for b i d d i n g , changes* in the
Work during construction, and other costs w h i c h are the
responsibility of the Owner, including those described in
this Article 2 and in Subparagraph 3.1.2. The O w n e r shall,
at the request of the Architect, provide a statement of
funds available for the Project, and their source.
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2.3 The Owner shall designate, when necessary, a representative authorized to act in the Owner's behalf with
respect to the Project. The Owner or such authorized
representative shall examine the documents submitted by
the Architect and shall render decisions pertaining thereto
promptly, to avoid unreasonable delay in the progress of
the Architect's services.
2.4 The Owner shall furnish a legal description and a
certified land survey of the site, giving, as applicable,
grades and lines of streets, alleys, pavements and adjoining property; rights-of-way, restrictions, easements, encroachments, zoning, deed restrictions, boundaries and
contours of the site; locations, dimensions and complete
data pertaining to existing buildings, other improvements
and trees; and full information concerning available service and utility lines both public and private, above and
below grade, including inverts and depths.
2.5 The Owner shall furnish the services of-soil engineers or other consultants when such services are deemed
necessary by the Architect. Such services shall include test
borings, test pits, soil bearing values, percolation tests, air
and water pollution tests, ground corrosion and resistivity
tests, including necessary operations for determining subsoil, air and water conditions, with reports and appropriate professional recommendations.
2.6 The Owner shall furnish structural, mechanical,
chemical and other laboratory tests, inspections and reports as required by law or the Contract Documents.
2.7 The Owner shall furnish all legal, accounting and insurance counseling services as may be necessary at any
time for the Project, including such auditing services as
the Owner may require to verify the Contractor's Applications for Payment or to ascertain how or for what purposes the Contractor uses the moneys paid by or on behalf of the Owner.
2.8 The services, information, surveys and reports required by Paragraphs 2.4 through 2.7 inclusive shall be
furnished at the Owner's expense, and the Architect shall
be entitled to rely upon the accuracy and completeness
thereof.
2.9 If the Owner observes or otherwise becomes aware
of any fault or defect in the Project or nonconformance
with the Contract Documents, prompt written notice
thereof shall be given by the Owner to the Architect.
2.10 The Owner shall furnish required information and
services and shall render approvals and decisions as expeditiously as necessary for the orderly progress of the
Architect's services and of the Work.
ARTICLE 3
CONSTRUCTION COST
3.1

DEFINITION

3.1.1 The Construction Cost shall be the total cost or
estimated cost to the Owner of all elements of the Project
designed or specified by the Architect.
3.1.2 The Construction Cost shall include at current
market rates, including a reasonable allowance for overhead and profit, the cost of labor and materials furnished
by the Owner and any equipment which has been de6
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signed, specified, selected or specially provided for by
the Architect.
3.1.3 Construction Cost does not include the compensation of the Architect and the Architect's consultants,
the cost of the land, rights-of-way, or other costs which
are the responsibility of the Owner as provided in Article 2.
•
3.2

RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSTRUCTION COST

3.2.1 Evaluations of the Owner's Project budget, Statements of Probable Construction Cost and Detailed
Estimates of Construction Cost, if any, prepared by the
Architect, represent the Architect's best judgment as a
design professional familiar with the construction industry. It is recognized, however, that neither the Architect
nor the Owner has control over the cost of labor, materials or equipment, over the Contractor's methods of determining bid prices, or over competitive bidding, market
or negotiating conditions. Accordingly, the Architect
cannot and does not warrant or represent that bids or
negotiated prices will not vary from the Project budget
proposed, established or approved by the Owner, if any,
or from any Statement of Probable Construction Cost or
other cost estimate or evaluation prepared by the Architect.
3.2.2 No fixed limit of Construction Cost shall be established as a condition of this Agreement by the furnishing,
proposal or establishment of a Project budget under Subparagraph 1.1.2 or Paragraph 2.2 or otherwise, unless such
fixed limit has been agreed upon in writing and signed by
the parties hereto. If such a fixed limit has been established, the Architect shall be permitted to include contingencies for design, bidding and price escalation, to determine what materials, equipment, component systems
and types of construction are to be included in the Contract Documents, to make reasonable adjustments in the
scope of the Project and to include in the Contract Documents alternate bids to adjust the Construction Cost to the
fixed limit. Any such fixed limit shall be increased in the
amount of any increase in the Contract Sum occurring
after execution of the Contract for Construction.
3.2.3 If the Bidding or Negotiation Phase has not commenced within three months after the Architect submits
the Construction Documents to the Owner, any Project
budget or fixed limit of Construction Cost shall be adjusted to reflect any change in the general level of prices
in the construction industry between the date of submission of the Construction Documents to the Owner and
the date on which proposals aire sought.
3.2.4 If a Project budget or fixed limit of Construction
Cost (adjusted as provided in Subparagraph 3.2.3) is exceeded by the lowest bona fide bid or negotiated proposal, the Owner shall (1) give written approval of an
increase in such fixed limit, (2) authorize rebidding or renegotiating of the Project within a reasonable time, (3) if
the Project is abandoned, terminate in accordance with
Paragraph 10.2, or (4) cooperate in revising the Project
scope and quality as required to reduce the Construction
Cost. In the case of (4), provided a fixed limit of Construction Cost has been established as a condition of this Agreement, the Architect, without additional charge, shall modify the Drawings and Specifications as necessary to comply
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with the fixed limit. The providing of such service shall be
the limit of the Architect's responsibility arising from the
establishment of such fixed limit, and having done so, the
Architect shall be entitled to compensation for all services
performed, in accordance with this Agreement, whether
or not the Construction Phase is commenced.
ARTICLE 4
DIRECT PERSONNEL EXPENSE
4.1 Direct Personnel Expense is defined as the direct salaries of ail the Architect's personnel engaged on the Project, and the portion of the cost of their mandatory and
customary contributions and benefits related thereto, such
as employment taxes and other statutory employee benefits, insurance, sick leave, holidays, vacations, pensions
and similar contributions and benefits.
ARTICLE 5
REIMBURSABLE EXPENSES
5.1 Reimbursable Expenses are in addition to the Compensation for Basic and Additional Services and include
actual expenditures made by the Architect and the Architect's employees and consultants in the interest of the
Project for the expenses listed in the following Subparagraphs:
5.1.1 Expense of transportation in connection with the
Project; living expenses in connection with out-of-town
travel; long distance communications, and iees paid for
securing approval of authorities having jurisdiction over
the Project.,
5.1.2 Expense of reproductions, postage and handling of
Drawings, Specifications and other documents, excluding
reproductions for the office use of the Architect and the
Architect's consultants.
5.1.3 Expense of data processing and photographic production techniques when used in connection with Additional Services.
5.1.4 If authorized in advance by the Owner, expense of
overtime work requiring higher than regular rates.
5.1.5 Expense of renderings, models and mock-ups requested by the Owner.
5.1.6 Expense of any additional insurance coverage or
limits, including professional liability insurance, requested
by the Owner in excess of that normally carried by the
Architect and the Architect's consultants.

6.1

-^*-4y0£nded through no fault of the Architect, com^ep^a*tion forany*^3^t^^e£vJces requiredf&r--***etT-?xtended
period of Administrauo^A^^^Coaitructi^ Contract
shall becornxUAie^f-JTsetforth in Paragrapn~T5THsf-AdUL:
Jiofwt'Services.
6.1.4 When compensation is based on a percentage of
Construction Cost, and any portions of the Project are
deleted or otherwise not constructed, compensation for
such portions of the Project shall be payable to the extent
services are performed on such portions, in accordance
with the schedule set forth in Subparagraph 14.2.2, based
on (1) the lowest bona fide bid or negotiated proposal or,
(2) if no such bid or proposal is received, the most recent
Statement of Probable Construction Cost or Detailed Estimate of Construction Cost for such portions of the Project.
6.2 PAYMENTS ON ACCOUNT OF
ADDITIONAL SERVICES
6.2.1 Payments on account of the Architect's Additional
Services as defined in Paragraph 1.7 and for Reimbursable
Expenses as defined in Article 5 shall be made monthly
upon presentation of the Architect's statement of services
rendered or expenses incurred.
6.3 PAYMENTS WITHHELD
6.3.1 No deductions shall be made from the Architect's
compensation on account of penalty, liquidated damages
or other sums withheld from payments to contractors, or
on account of the cost of changes in the Work other than
those for which the Architect is held legally liable.
6.4

PROJECT SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION

6.4.1 If the Project is suspended or abandoned in whole
or in part for more than three months, the Architect shall
be compensated for all services performed prior to receipt
of written notice from the Owner of such suspension or
abandonment, together with Reimbursable Expenses then
due and all Termination Expenses as defined in Paragraph
10.4. If the Project is resumed after being suspended for
more than three months, the Architect's compensation
shall be equitably adjusted.
ARTICLE 7
ARCHITECT'S ACCOUNTING RECORDS

ARTICLE 6

7.1 Records of Reimbursable Expenses and expenses pertaining to Additional Services and services performed on
the basis of a "Multiple of Direct Personnel Expense shall
be kept on the basfs of generally accepted accounting
principles and shall be available to the, Owner or the
Owner's authorized representative at mutually convenient
times.

PAYMENTS TO THE ARCHITECT

ARTICLE 8

PAYMENTS ON ACCOUNT OF BASIC SERVICES

^6*1*1 An initial payment as set forth in Paragraph T ^ - t ^
the mTrYrroqm payment under this Agreemenr^^^-^^
6.1.2 Subsequen^fcayments for Ba^ie-Services shall be
made monthly and shaTH^eJn^^itJportion to services performed within each Pba5eoT>e€vkes, on the basis set
forth in A r t i c l e > K ^ ^
^"^-^^
6 . 1 . 3 J i ^ f ) 3 t o the extent that the Contract T^n^te^Qitially
,0*t3t>lished in the Contract for Construction is exceeftwl*
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OWNERSHIP AND USE OF DOCUMENTS
8.1 Drawings and Specifications as instruments of service are and shalj remain the property of the Architect
whether the Project for which they are made is executed
or not. The Owner shall be permitted to retain copies, including reproducible copies, of Drawings and Specifications for information and reference in connection with the
Owner's use and occupancy of the Project. The Drawings
and Specifications shall not be used by the Owner on
ON • JJLY 197? • A I A * • © 1977

vv.. WASHINGTON. DC. 20006.

B141-1977

v):.v:3d

7

ler projects, tor additions to this Project, or for compters of this Project by others provided the Architect is not
default under this Agreement, except by agreement in
ting and with appropriate compensation to the Archit.
Submission or distribution to meet official regulatory
luirements or for other purposes in connection with the
>ject is not to be construed as publication in derogation
the Architect's rights.

ARTICLE 9
ARBITRATION
I All claims, disputes and other matters in question'
^ween the parties to this Agreement, arising out ofyOr
a\ing to this Agreement or the breach thereof, shal/be
cia^d by arbitration in accordance with the Construe>n Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Xrbitra>n Association then obtaining unless the partes mutely agree\therwise. No arbitration, arising o\f\ of or reting to thiVAgreement, shall include, by consolidation,
inder or in a\y other manner, any additional person not
party to this Agreement except by written consent conining a specificWerence to this Agreement and signed
i the Architect, tnWOwner, and any/Other penon sought
i be joined. Any cohsent to arbitration involving an aditional person or persfems shall not constitute consent to
bitration of any dispufft not described therein or with
iy person not named or\jestribed therein. This Agreement to arbitrate and any agreement to arbitrate with an
dditional person or perstfos>duly consented to by the
arties to this Agreement shall oe specifically enforceable
nder the prevailing arbitration laV
.2 Notice of the demand for arbitration shall be filed in
/rating with the omer party to this Agreement and with
he American Acoitration Association. The demand shall
»e made withir/a reasonable time after tneclaim, dispute
»r other matter in question has arisen. In >*p event shall
be demancMor arbitration be made after tnk date when
nstitutior/of legal or equitable proceedingsNbased on
uch clarm, dispute or other matter in question ^ould be
»arred4)y the applicable statute of limitations.
\
>.3/The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be Hnal,
ina judgment may be entered upon it in accordance with
rpplicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof. \
ARTICLE 10
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT
10.1 This Agreement may be terminated by either party
upon seven days' written notice should the other party
fail substantially to perform in accordance with its terms
through no fault of the party initiating the termination.
10.2 This Agreement may be terminated by the Owner
upon at least seven days' written notice to the Architect
in the event that the Project is permanently abandoned.
10.3 In the event of termination not the fault of the Architect, the Architect shall be compensated for all services
performed to termination date, together with Reimbursable Expenses then due and all Termination Expenses as
defined in Paragraph 10.4.
8 B141-1977

10.4 Termination Expenses include expenses directly attributable to termination for which the Architect is not
otherwise compensated, plus an amount computed as a
percentage of the total Basic and Additional Compensation earned to the time of termination, as follows:
.1 20 percent if termination occurs during the Schematic Design Phase; or
.2 10 percent if termination occurs during the Design
Development Phase; or
.3 5 percent if termination occurs during any subsequent phase.
ARTICLE 11
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
11.1 Unless otherwise specified, this Agreement shall be
governed by the law of the principal place of business of
the Architect.
11.2 Terms in this Agreement shall have the same meaning as those in AIA Document A201, General Conditions
of the Contract for Construction, current as of the date
of this Agreement.
11.3 As between the parties to this Agreement: as to all
acts or failures to act by either party to this Agreement,
any applicable statute of limitations shall commence to
run and any alleged cause of action shall be deemed to
have accrued in any and all events not later than the relevant Date of Substantial Completion of the Work, and as
to any acts or failures to act occurring after the relevant
Date of Substantial Completion, not later than the date of
issuance of the final Certificate for Payment.
11.4 The Owner and the Architect waive all rights
against each other and against the contractors, consultants, agents and employees of the other for damages covered by any property insurance during construction as set
forth in the edition of AIA Document A201, General Conditions, current as of the date of this Agreement. The
Owner and the Architect each shall require appropriate
similar waivers from their contractors, consultants and
agents.
ARTICLE 12
SUCCESSORS A N D ASSIGNS
12.1 The Owner and the Architect, respectively, bind
themselves, their partners, successors, assigns and legal
representatives to the other party to this Agreement and
to the partners, successors, assigns and legal representatives of such other party with respect to all covenants of
this Agreement. Neither the Owner nor the Architect shall
assign, sublet or transfer any interest In this Agreement
without the written consent of the other.
ARTICLE 13
EXTENT OF AGREEMENT
13.1 This Agreement represents the entire and integrated
agreement between the Owner and the Architect and
supersedes all prior negotiations, representations or agreements, either written or oral. This Agreement may be
amended only by written instrument signed by both
Owner and Architect.
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Messrs Roger H. Elton and
John H. Laub
3900 North Wolf Creek Drive
Eden, Utah 84310
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STATEMENT

July 29, 1982
Completion of Programming and Schematic Design Phase
(Phase I) for the design of the Wolf Creek-Recreation
Center per Letter of Agreement dated March 4, 1982.
(Hourly fees exceeded agreed upon limit of $7,500.00)
$7,500.00

AMOUNT DUE:

1275

WOLF CREEK PROPERTIES
P. O. BOX 633 745-3737
BRICHAM CITY, UTAH

87-28/1243

84302

23 September
fle

******BRKEN & CHRISTOPHER ARCHITECTS*********

t*7,500.00*

****SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED a n d 0 0 / 1 0 0 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
0MIOHAM CITY OFFICE

First Security Bonk of Utah
•jmo«Ai AStocunon
MAIN 4 FOREST • BRIGHAM CITY. UTAH 14302

••00 I Z?Si" 11121*3002881:03^ 0 0 7 3 ?

1Q82

l&n*

Dolla

September 30, 1982

Messrs. Roger H. Elt«i and
John H. Laub
Attorneys at Law
3900 North Wolf Creek Drive
Eden, Utah . 84310
Gentlemen:
I'm sorry that we were not able to meet today to go over
our progress on the Wolf Creek Recreation Center.
I had a good meeting with Scott Allen last Friday at Wolf
Creek to review our contract documents in progress. We
identified some areas where refinements to the design could
produce a better solution and have subsequently incorporated
these into our.drawings.
We have completed our work on the Phase One Bid Package and
will deliver the package to Wolf Creek on Monday the 4th for
issuance to bidders. The package includes all of the earthwork, a security fence and a construction sign.
Developing an estimate for the work on this bid package
has been extremely difficult. We have received estimating
information from two earthwork contractors that varies
considerably. Our pricing information develops earthwork
costs anywhere from $33,000 to $81,000. The huge discrepancy in these figures is due, largely, to unknowns in the
quality of the fill material available. If we can use
material at the sewer lagoon site, the cost may approach
the low figure, provided that eliminating the large boulders
is not cost prohibitive. If imported fill is purchased
from a remote source, the cost may approach the high figure. We remain hopeful that the material at the lagoon
will be satisfactory.
Fred, Scott and Clair were here this afternoon so we had
a chance to review this bid package with them.

Messrs. Roger H. Elton and
John H. Laub
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Work on the other contract documents is progressing well,
with all of our consulting engineers in full gear in order
to meet our next deadline.
I would like very much to receive an executed copy of the
Owner/Architect Agreement so that I can execute agreements
with our consulting engineers.
Thanks very much.
Sincerely,

James W. Christopher, FAIA
JWC/je
Encl.
cc: Clair Cox

'17

essrs. Roger H. Elton and
ohn H. Laub
;900 North Wolf Creek Drive
Iden, Utah 84310
•AT: VEN'T

September 30, 1982
Completion of design development and contract documents
for the Phase One Bid Package of site excavation and
preparation.
$ 2,500.00
Balance from 6/29/82 statement
7,500.00
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE:

$10,000.00

5©

f
Mr. Clair Cox
Wolf Creek Country Club Resort
3900 North Wolf Creek Drive
Eden, Utah 84310

DATE

October 4, 1982
PROJECT

Wolf Creek, Phase One
ADDRESS

Eden, Utah

SUBJECT p h a s e 0 n e

construction

SANSMITTAL

Transmitted herewith are five sets of drawings and specifications
Dr Phase One Construction "Earthwork"f for the Wolf Creek Resort RecreaLon Center,

B>

James w. Christopher, FAIA
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December 1, 1982
•5 fPIAINTIFPS
EXHIBIT
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John Laub, Esquire
Post Office Box 633
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Dear John:
Enclosed, for your information, is the Recreation Center architectural contract on Wolf Creek, together with a change order.
I am not sure the change order is justified. Could you have
Clair or Scott make a determination?
Yours truly,

Roger H. Elton
RHErrah
Enclosures

w

November 26, 1932

Mr. Roger H. Elton
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 2878
Reno, Nevada 89505
Dear Roger:
Pursuant to our telephone conversation of last Wednesday,
I have prepared an amendment to our Letter of Agreement
dated August 2, 1982 for architectural services for the
Wolf Creek Recreation Center.
Since the date of the original Agreement, the scope of the
project has been more closely defined (and expanded). Extra
consulting fees will be required for structural design of
the foundation system and retaining walls due to specialized
sub-surface conditions as well as in mechanical design for
a more complex mechanical system based upon our life cycle
cost analysis. These additional consulting fees total an
extra $8,000.
Since the Agreement dated August 2, 1982 has not yet been
signed by you, I am including two copies of it with the
amendment for your signature. Ifve also included a statement
for services to date through completion of Design Development,
based upon the amended Agreement.
As you know, we are very anxious to have this Agreement
signed and returned since we are well into the project and
still have not been able to execute agreements with our
consulting engineers.
Thanks very much for your prompt attention to this request.
Sincerely,

James W. Christopher, FAIA
JWC/je
Encl.

Mr. Roger H. Elton
Roger H. Elton, Ltd.
P. 0. Box 2878
Reno, Nevada 89505

&
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STATEMENT

November 26, 1982
Completion of Design Development documents for the
Wolf Creek Recreation Center in accordance with payment
schedule outlined in Amendment No, 1 to Architect/
Owner Agreement of August 2, 1982.
Work Completed
Phase I

- Schematic Design

Phase II - Design Development
Total Fee Earned:
Amount Paid To Date:
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE:

Fee
$ 8,500.
19,000.
$27,500.
-0-

$27,500.

Ir. Roger H. E l t o n
toger H. E l t o n , Ltd.
?. 0 . Box 2878
teno, Nevada
89505

TATEMENT

January 17, 1983
Progress billing for architectural services for the
Wolf Creek Recreation Center in accordance with payment schedule outlined in Amendment No. 1 to Architect/
Owner Agreement of August 2, 1982.
Work Completed
Phase I

- Schematic Design

Phase II

- Design Development

Phase III - Construction Documents
85% complete
Total Fee Earned:
Amount Paid to Date:
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE:

cc:

John Laub

Amount
$ 8,500.
19,000.
30,000.
$57,500,
-0-
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February 18, 1983

Mr. Roger H. Elton
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 2878
Reno, Nevada 89505
Dear Roger:
This morning we met to discuss the change in mechanical
systems for the Wolf Creek Recreation Center. In attendance were representatives from our office, Olsen & Peterson
(our consulting mechanical engineer), Wolf Creek
(Scott Allen), and Energy Control Systems (manufacturers
of the heat pump system).
The study conducted by our office and Olsen & Peterson
yielded the following results.
1.

Initial Costs
a)
b)
c)

Mechanical System
Electrical System
Architectural System

- $12,488
+
2,500
+
3,500

Total Savings:
2.

- $ 6,500

Operating Costs
a)

Savings per year

3. Additional mechanical,

- $ 2,000

electrical,

and architectural redesign fees

+ $ 4,380

The figures look good to us, and our engineers are very comfortable with the heat pump system. Other advantages include
reduced moisture in the building, no propane tank requirements,
and no rooftop equipment.

S3

Mr. Roger H. Elton

Page 2

Scott Allen seems very pleased with the way that the same
system is performing in the Time Share units and is willing
to sacrifice the additional space required for the units
within the building. His recommendation is to design and
install the heat pump system.
Scott suggested that I transmit this information to you
for your consideration, but not to initiate any further
work until we receive direction from you.
Sincerely,

James W. Christopher, FAIA
JWC/jse
cc: John H. Laub
Scott Allen

ROGER H. ELTON, LTD.
A T T O R N E Y S AT L A W

PLEASE REPLY TO:
RENO OFFICE
'EST StCOND ST SLMTL 2~C
HENO. NV 6 9 S 0 3
MAILING ADDRESS
P O I O « ZB7t
HENO. NV » 9 S 0 5

LAS VEGAS OFFICE

Reno

(702 > 7»€> 3BB0

NtN-TH FLOOR
VALLEY BANK CENTER
»Ot CONVENTION CENTER DRIVE
LAS VEGAS NV 09109

<702l 7 3 3 5 9 6 6

February 23, 1983

James W. Christopher, FAIA
Brixen & Christopher Architects
252 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dear Jim:
When Wolf Creek goes to bid on the Recreation Center,
we should have incorporated the mechanical systems change
you discussed with Scott.
Yours truly,

Roger H. Elton
RHE/mk
cc

Scott Allen
John Laub
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